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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-
RES JUDICATA APPLIED TO DETERMINATION OF
SISTER STATE CONCERNING EX PARTE DIVORCE
The complainant filed a bill praying that his interest as sur-
viving consort of the testatrix be established. The defendants
filed a special plea alleging that the testatrix had obtained an
ex parte Florida divorce a year before her death. Complainant
in his replication challenged the jurisdictional basis of the
Florida divorce. The Virginia court after a full hearing on the
merits as to whether the testatrix had been domiciled in Florida
and had given proper constructive notice to complainant, con-
cluded that the requisites for jurisdiction had been met. It gave
full faith and credit to the Florida divorce decree and denied
complainant's claim. Appeal and supersedeas refused. Kessler
v. McGlone, 187 Va. lxii, certiorari denied, 335 U.S. 860 (1948).
Complainant later filed a bill in the original Florida court against
the same defendants as in the Virginia action, seeking to void
the divorce on the identical grounds that had been litigated in
Virginia. The Florida court rejected the contention that the find-
ings of the Virginia court were res judicata and refused to grant
full faith and credit to its decision. On the same evidence and
some additional evidence, the trial court reached a different
conclusion than the Virginia court as to the proper constructive
service on the complainant and as to the domicile of the testatrix,
and declared the divorce decree null and void. Upon appeal,
held, affirmed. McGlone v. Kessler, ...... Fla ....... , 55 So.2d
79 (1951). The defendants did not seek certiorari. Almost
a year after the second Florida suit, complainant instituted a
separate and independant suit in the original Virginia court
against the same defendants alleging that the Virginia court
must render full faith and credit to the second Florida decree.
This the court refused to do on the grounds that the issue was
res judicata in Virginia and that Florida should have given full
faith and credit to the Virginia decision. Upon appeal, held,
affirmed. Kessler v. Fauquier Na'l Bank, 195 Va. 1095, 81 S.E.
2d 440, certiorari denied, 348 U.S. 834 (1954).
The basic issue here is whether either the Virginia or the
Florida court has violated the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution' and the statute2 passed pursuant to this constitu-
tional authority.
In considering the effect to be given the duly attested record
of another state under the full faith and credit clause, the United
States Supreme Court in Adam v. Saenger3 said:
If it appears on its face to be a record of a court of general
jurisdiction, such jurisdiction, over the cause and the
parties is to be presumed unless disproved by extrin-
sic evidence, or by the record itself. Hanley v. Donohue,
116 U. S. 1; Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke Co., 19 Wall. 58;
Settlemier v. Sullivan, 97 U.S. 444. But in a suit upon the
judgment of another state the jurisdiction of the court which
rendered it is open to judicial inquiry, Chicago Life Insur-
ance Company v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, and if the matter of
fact or law on which jurisdiction depends was not litigated
in the original suit, it is a matter to be adjudicated in the
suit founded upon the judgment. Thompson v. Whitman,
18 Wall. 457.4 (Emphasis added)
Under the ruling of the Haddock case5 a record of an ex
parte divorce was not entitled to full faith and credit since mere
domicile within the state of one party to the marriage did not
give the courts of that state jurisdiction to render a decree of
divorce enforceable in all the other states against a resident who
did not appear and was only constructively served with notice
of the pendency of the action. The first Williams case6 expressly
overruled the Haddock case, and under this new ruling an
ex parte divorce with jurisdiction based on domicile of one party
and constructive service upon the other is always entitled to
full faith and credit as to the marital status of both parties.
In an early case, German Savings & Loan Soc. v. Dort-
mitzer,7 and later in the second Williams case8 the Court held
I U.S. Const., Art. IV, §1: "Section 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
228 U.S.C., 1952 ed., §1738: "Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies
thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law
or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are
taken."
' 303 U.S. 59 (1937).
4Id. at 62.
5 Haddock v. Haddock 201 U S. 562 (1906).
' Williams v. North CZarolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
7 German Savings & Loan Soc. v. Dortmitzer, 192 U.S. 125 (1904).
s Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
that a decree of divorce may be impeached collaterally in the
courts of another state by proof that the court granting it had
no jurisdiction because of the plaintiff's lack of domicile. Both
decisions contemplate extrinsic evidence to show there was no
jurisdictional basis, and the second Williams case9 goes so far
as to say:
In short the decree of divorce is a conclusive adjudication of
everything except the jurisdictional facts upon which it is
founded and domicile is a jurisdictional fact.'0
With this array of authority before it, the Virginia court in
its first determination correctly went into the jurisdictional facts
of the ex parte divorce rendered in Florida since those facts had
not been litigated in Florida. In fact, there was no contention
that the Virginia court did not have the right to litigate the
matters before it, and it had personal jurisdiction of all the in-
terested parties. The rule is that such a determination is res
judicata in Virginia. The Supreme Court of Appeals in Patterson
v. Saunders" said.
A fact necessarily involved in an issue, on which there has
been a judgment, is thereby conclusively settled in any
suit thereafter between the same parties and their privies.12
Mr. Justice Eggleston, speaking for the court in Ward v.
Charlton, 177 Va. 101, 12 S.E.2d 791 (1941), said: "The
doctrine of resJudicata or estoppel by judgment is based on
public policy. 2 Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed., §626, p.
1318; 30 Am.Jur., Judgments, §165, pp. 910, 911. It pro-
ceeds upon the principle that one person shall not the second
time litigate, with the same person or with another so iden-
tified in interest with such person that he represents the
same legal right, precisely the same question, particular con-
trovery, or issue, which has been necessarily tried and fi-
nally determined, upon the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction, in a judgment in personam in a former suit.'
United States v. California Bridge & Construction Co., 245
U.S. 337, 341, 38 Sup.Ct. 91, 93, 62 L.Ed. 332.
'325 U.S. 226 (1945).10 Id. at 232.21 194 Va. 607, 74 S.E.2d 204 (1953).
12 Id. at 61.2, 74 S.E.2d 204, 208.
'The doctrine is firmly established in our jurisprudence
and should be maintained where applicable."13 (Emphasis
added)
We have learned from Adam v. Saenger 14 that if the matter
of fact on which jurisdiction depends was not litigated in the
original suit, it is a matter to be adjudicated in the suit founded
upon the judgment. The Virginia court in the case under dis-
cussion decided the jurisdictional facts15 upon which the Florida
divorce decree was founded, and thus determined all the facts
necessary for a valid divorce decree under the ruling of the
first Williams v. North Carolina case.16 Further, on the basis of
res judicata the Virginia determination could not be attacked
in Virginia.17
At this point it might be argued that the Virginia decision
should have been held to preclude Florida from going into the
issue of jurisdiction again since the full faith and credit clause
and the statute passed pursuant thereto require that a judgment
be given the same effect in every other state as it is given in the
state from which it is taken. The Florida Supreme Court ap-
parently answered such an argument with its Mabson v. Mabson
decision i8 in which it had said:
The right of the Florida court to determine whether or
not its own jurisdiction has been properly invoked and exer-
cised cannot be barred by what has been determined by the
courts of any- other state. The courts of this state retain at
all times jurisdiction to entertain a bill or other proceeding
making a direct attack upon the validity of decrees rendered
here, so whateveh may have been decided in some other state
in a collateral proceeding, whatever between the same parties
or not, would constitute no bar to a proceeding in the courts
of this state in which the courts of this state are called upon
to determine for themselves their own jurisdiction and the
regularity of their own judgments. 19 (Emphasis added)
2: Id. at 614, 74 S.E.2d 204, 209.
1" 303 U.S. 59 (1937).
2s It should be noted that the jurisdictional facts were not litigated in the Florida
ex part. divorce case and that they were thus originally adjudicated in Virginia.
1s0317 U.S. 287 (1942).11 Patterson v.. Saunders, 194 Va. 607, 612, 74 S.E.2d 204, 208 (1953). See p. 165 supra.
1s 104 Fla. 162, 140 So. 801 (1932).
19 104 Fla. 162 ....... 140 So. 801, 803.
20 ...... Fla........ 55 So.2d 79 (1951).
A careful reading will show that Mabson v. Mabson was not
even in point on the issue involved in .McGlone v. Kessler 20 in as
much as the Florida court in the Mabson case was not asked to
decide anything that had already been decided in New York.
However, even if we concede that the Mabson case was in point,
it was superseded in 1939 by Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.21
In that case the United States Supreme Court, considering what
matters might be litigated by courts of one state in regard to
decisions of another state and the applicability of res judicata
to the matter thus litigated, said:
As the Idaho District Court was a court of general jurisdic-
tion, its conclusions are unassailable collaterally except for
fraud or lack of jurisdiction. The holding by the Idaho court
of no jurisdiction in Washington necessarily determined the
question raised here as to the Idaho jurisdiction against
Miss Treinies' contention. She is bound by that judgment.
The power of the Idaho court to examine into the juris-
diction of the Washington court is beyond question. Even
where the decision against the validity of the original judg-
ment is erroneous, it is a valid exercise of judicial power by
the second court.
One trial of an issue is enough. "T he principles of res
judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other
issues," as well to jurisdiction of the subject matter as of
the parties.22 (Emphasis added)
The Court reiterated the same idea, based however on the
full faith and credit clause, in later cases23 that were decided
before the Virginia decision was pleaded as res judicata in
Florida. In the same year that McGlone v. Kessler24 was before
the Florida court, the Supreme Court in two more important
decisions2 5 made even stronger statements to the same effect in
reaffirming the Treinies doctrine. Thus it becomes apparent
that the Florida court failed to render full faith and credit to
the Virginia decree.
$1 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
"2 Id. at 78.
I8 Sherrer v. Sherrer 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
Fl 55 go.2d 79 (1951).
is Johnson v. duelberger 340 U.S. 581, 583 (1951); Sutton v. Lieb, 342 U.S. 402. 408,
rehearing", dud, 3435 U.S. 921 (1951).
The remaining question to be considered is whether the
second Florida decree was entitled to full faith and credit. Does
the full faith and credit clause contemplate giving full faith
and credit to a determination which was already foreclosed due
to the full faith and credit clause? Surely not. If this were
true, instead of having the uniformity that the full faith and
credit clause does contemplate, we would have repeated litiga-
tion merely because the courts of one state refuse to recognize
the decisions of a sister state. The writer feels that such a con-
tention is untenable and that any decision which has failed to
render full faith and credit is not itself entitled to full faith and
credit.
It is submitted that the United States Supreme Court should
have granted certiorari in the case under comment and then
stated directly what was said so succinctly by way of dictum in
Sutton v. Lieb.28 This was in effect that if an ex parte divorce
is rendered and later contested in a court of general jurisdiction
with all parties before it, the second court's finding that there
was or was not jurisdiction to render the divorce decree is en-
titled to full faith and credit throughout the Nation, in the state
which has granted the divorce as well as in all others.27
Frank M. McCann
26 "If the Nevada court had had jurisdiction by personal service in the state or appearance
in the case of Henzel and the first Mrs. Henzel its decree of divorce would have
been unassailable in other states. So as to the New York decree annulling the
marriage, New York had such jurisdiction of the parties and its decree is entitled
to full faith throughout the Nation, in Nevada as well as in Illinois. The New
York invalidation of the Nevada divorce of the Hesoels stands in the same position.
As Mrs. Henzel was neither personally served in Nevada nor entered her appear-
ance, the Nevada divorce decree was subject to attack and nullification in New
York for lack of jurisdiction over the parties is a contested action" [Emphasis added]
342 U.S. 402, 408 (1951).
27 It would seem that the result reached by the Virginia Court can be justified upon
another line of reasoning, without regard to the propriety of the second Florida
decision. The first Virginia decision was in an in rein proceeding to dispose of the
title to property situated in this state. In disposing of that property the Court was
required, as to the status of parties involved, to recognize foreign divorce decrees
based upon adequate jurisdiction within the meaning of the full faith and credit
clause. The Virginia Court painstakingly did its full duty. Thereafter, later de-
cisions of other states as to such status cannot have any effect as to property al-
ready disposed of. A state which has disposed of property with due regard to the
full faith and credit clause, as applied to the situation then existing, should not berequired to start all over again with a new property distribution. For another
discussion of Kessler v. Fauquier Nat'l Bank, see Recent Decisions,68 Harv.L.Rev.
719 (1955).
